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DUTIES OF ATTORNEYS ADVISING FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE S&L CRISIS
CHRISTOPHER G. SABLICH*
I. INTRODUCTION
"RTC Sues Jones Day."' "RTC Sues Troutman Sanders." 2 "Kaye
Scholer Agrees to Settle With RTC for Up to $22 Million."13 "Ex-Part-
ners Targeted in S&L Cleanup: RTC Extends Its Search for Culpable
Attorneys."14 "FDIC Seeks $300 Million in Suit Against Law Firm."' 5
"Where Were The Lincoln Lawyers?" 6 These and other similar head-
lines have become almost routine fare of legal newspapers, journals and
periodicals over the past two years.
Banking attorneys, like all other participants in the S&L crisis in-
cluding the bankers, accountants, appraisers, regulators, Congress, and
even the depositors, have been criticized for contributing to the crisis and
the massive losses to be borne by the taxpayers. Some of those attorneys
are now being asked to pay for their share of the losses.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") and the Res-
olution Trust Corporation ("RTC"), the receivers of failed federally-in-
sured financial institutions, have filed numerous, multi-million dollar
malpractice suits against the attorneys of now-failed institutions. 7 In ad-
dition, the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS"), regulator of federal
S&Ls, has taken administrative actions seeking restitution from the at-
torneys of several failed thrifts. 8 These legal actions targeting bank attor-
* I would like to thank Assistant Professor Anita Bernstein, Chicago-Kent College of Law,
and Mary E. Gootjes for their assistance and encouragement throughout the development of this
Note. A very special thanks goes to Rosella, Leah and Stephanie Sablich for their patience and
invaluable support.
1. Rita H. Jensen, RTC Sues Jones Day, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 15, 1991, at 2.
2. Gail D. Cox, RTC Sues Troutman, NAT'L L.J., July 22, 1991, at 2.
3. Edward A. Adams, Kaye Scholer Agrees to Settle With RTC for Up to $22 Million, N.Y.
L.J., Aug. 6, 1991, at 1.
4. David Newdorf, Ex-Partners Targeted in S&L Cleanup; RTC Extends Its Search for Culpa-
ble Attorneys, LEGAL TIMES, May 27, 1991, at 10.
5. FDIC Seeks $300 Million in Suit Against Law Firm; Alleges Malpractice, Negligence, 54
BANKING REP. (BNA) 547 (Mar. 26, 1990)[hereinafter FDIC Seeks $300 Million].
6. Rita H. Jensen, Where Were the Lincoln Lawyers?, NAT'L L.J., May 6, 1991, at 26.
7. See, e.g., Charles F. Byrd & Isabella W. Sammons, FDIC Legal Action Against Attorneys
and Other Professionals, 108 BANKING L.J. 420 (1991); see also supra notes 1-6 and accompanying
text.
8. See, e.g., OTS Settles With Silverado Law Firm, Reaches Separate Agreement on C&D Or-
der, 56 BANKING REP. (BNA) 1204 (June 24, 1991); OS Freezes Kaye, Scholer's Assets, Asks for
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neys are unprecedented in three ways. First, the federal receivers
traditionally have not pursued the attorneys of failed institutions. In the
past, the FDIC and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpora-
tion (predecessor to the RTC) had primarily targeted the directors and
officers of failed institutions. 9 Now the FDIC and RTC have over forty
attorney malpractice suits in process. 10 Second, the receivers and regula-
tors have named some of the largest and most prestigious firms in the
country in these actions. Third, and most significantly, the suits allege
that the attorneys' actions had caused substantial losses which contrib-
uted to the failure of those institutions. 12 The suits do not address iso-
lated instances of negligent .representation. Rather, they allege ongoing
breaches of the attorneys' fiduciary duties to their clients, specifically
those duties which impact on the safe and sound operation of the bank.
Those breaches, according to the liquidators, have resulted in some of the
most costly bank and savings and loan failures in the nation's history. 3
$275 Million in Restitution, 58 BANKING REP. (BNA) 419 (March 9, 1992)[hereinafter OTS Freezes
Kaye, Scholer Assets]. The OTS initiated these administrative enforcement actions pursuant to 12
U.S.C.A. § 1818(b) (1991).
Bank attorneys may be subject to cease and desist orders, as well as other civil enforcement
actions, by the federal banking regulators if they are determined to be institution-affiliated parties, as
defined in 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(u) (1991). See Raymund G. Kawaski, Comment, Liability of Attor-
neys, Accountants, Appraisers, and Other Independent Contractors Under the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 42 HASTINGs L.J. 249, 258-59, 265-72 (1990).
The OTS has no standing to sue for attorney malpractice. Generally, an attorney is liable only
to her client. See Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879). The concept of privity has long
protected attorneys from malpractice claims by nonclients. Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96,
99 (Ill. 1982). However, some courts have held that attorneys may be liable for damages caused by
their negligence to a third party, where that third party was intended to be benefitted by the attor-
ney's performance. See, e.g., id., at 100; Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal.
Rptr. 901, 905 (1976). Even under an expanded view of attorney liability to third parties, it appears
unlikely that the OTS could have standing to sue bank attorneys for malpractice because it would
not be the party incurring any damages.
9. See generally, Danny Clearman, Comment, FDIC and FSLIC Pursuit of Claims Against
Officers, Directors and Others Involved With Failed Lenders, 58 Miss. L.J. 89 (1988).
10. Suits Against Bank Lawyers Now Number 44 at the FDIC, BANKING Arr'y, Sept. 6, 1991,
at 1. The FDIC and RTC staff expect this number to increase significantly. Byrd & Sammons, supra
note 7, at 422.
The increase in corporate attorney malpractice suits has not been limited to banking. More and
more, attorneys are being sued by people injured in dubious financial deals. Lawyer Deep Pockets,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at 34.
11. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 1; Cox, supra note 2; Adams, supra note 3.
12. See complaint at 4, FDIC v. Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 90-
0488); First amended complaint at 59, FDIC v. Wise, (D. Clo. 1990) (No. 90-1688); Third
amended complaint at 17, RTC v. Keating, (D. Ariz. 1991) (No. 89-1509 PHX-RMB); Complaint at
2, FDIC v. Vaughn, (N.D. Tex. 1990) (No. 2255-90-12-(2.0)-2).
13. The cost of the Lincoln S&L failure is estimated to be $2.5 billion. Rita H. Jensen, Rever-
berations From a Failure, NAT'L L. J., Nov. 13, 1989, at 1. The Silverado Banking, Savings and
Loan Association failure will cost the taxpayers approximately $1 billion. Neil Bush, Other Silverado
Board Members, and S&L's Law Firm Agree to Settle With FDIC, 56 BANKING REP. (BNA) 1058
(June 3, 1991).
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The bank attorney's duties to her client in this context is an unset-
tled area of law. Few suits of this nature have ever been filed. Most, if
not all, have been settled before final adjudication.14 The number, nature
and amount of the receivers' and regulators' suits raise serious questions
for the banking bar.15 What are the duties of bank counsel, specifically
when the client is planning or has committed some act which may ad-
versely affect the safe and sound operations of the institution? Are the
FDIC, RTC and OTS attempting to hold bank counsel to higher stan-
dards of duty in this regard? Do bank attorneys have a duty to ensure
the safe and sound operation of their clients? Or, assuming the receivers'
case-specific allegations are true, have the bank counsel-defendants alleg-
edly breached duties which they knew or should have known existed?
14. See Adams, supra note 3; Sherman & Howard and co-defendants agreed to a $26.5 million
settlement in FDIC v. Wise, 758 F. Supp. 1414 (D. Colo. 1991) (C.A. No. 90-F-1688, settlement
agreement dated June 5, 1991). Similarly, the FDIC's negligence suits against directors and officers
are almost always resolved through settlement. According to an agency spokeswoman, 90% to 95%
of FDIC suits alleging director and officer liability are settled before they get to the courtroom.
Christi Harlan & Milo Geyelin, FDIC Wins Rare Negligence Trial Against Bank Officers, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 16, 1991, at B5. But see FDIC v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546, 552 (5th Cii. 1990) (upholding
trial court's determination that bank attorney/director was liable for malpractice for advising the
board to approve loans in excess of the lending limit).
15. See Dennis J. Lehr, Balancing the Fourth Branch: Dealing With the FDIC/RTC Focus on
Attorney Conduct, 57 BANKING REP. (BNA) (July 8, 1991); ABA Task Force Studies Liability of
Counsel for Depository Institutions, 55 BANKING REP. (BNA) 755 (November 5, 1990); Divisions
Within Depository Bar Developing, Reflect Gap Between Regulators, Private Bar, BANKING ATT'Y,
Aug. 16, 1991, at 4; Depository Bar Has Professional Duty to Resist Fourth Branch Encroachments,
BANKING Arr'Y, July 5, 1991, at 5; John K. Villa & Thomas J. Murphy, Emerging Theories of
Liability for Lending Counsel, in LITIGATING FOR AND AGAINST THE FDIC AND RTC 257 (PLI
program 1990).
Critics of the FDIC, RTC and OTS claim that they, through their recent legal actions, are
attempting to impose higher standards of professional conduct for bank attorneys. More specifically,
the critics charge that the receivers and regulators, without justification, are imposing upon the
attorney the duty to "police" the client, to ensure it complies with laws and prudent banking stan-
dards, to ensure the client's directors and managers fulfill their fiduciary duties, and to report non-
compliance and improprieties to the regulator. The critics argue that such duties are not supported
by case law or professional ethical standards, noting also that the latter alleged duty is inconsistent
with the Codes of Professional Responsibility Conduct and the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Some fear that the malpractice insurers will increase rates to the point where the costs become
prohibitive. As a result, many firms may decide to pass the high rates onto the banks or even
withdraw from bank representation altogether.
Similar concerns were raised by securities lawyers in the early 1970's in response to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") legal actions against attorneys. Critics had claimed that
the SEC was imposing upon securities lawyers a duty to the securities market. Some interpreted this
duty to the market to include a duty to reveal to the public misleading or fraudulent information
contained in their clients' disclosure documents. See Frederick D. Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant
Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1974). The most noted case was SEC
v. Nat'l Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). In that case, the SEC charged
two prestigious firms, Lord, Bissell & Brook and White & Case, with violations of several sections of
the Securities Act. The court ultimately determined that the attorneys did not have a duty to dis-
close the misleading information to the SEC or to the public. However, the attorneys were held
liable for aiding and abetting securities law violations by not preventing the misleading disclosure.
Id. at 713.
1992)
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The bank attorney's duties are significantly influenced by the nature
of the banking industry and the broad duties of the bank director. This
note will outline the critical duties of counsel engaged to provide advice
on banking transactions or practices which may affect the condition of
the financial institution. The duties set forth below would also apply to
attorneys representing banks with regard to regulatory issues and rela-
tions with bank regulators. The note will distinguish the duties of bank
counsel from those of a non-bank corporate attorney.
This note will first review the unique aspects of the highly-regulated,
federally-insured financial institution in relation to other corporate enti-
ties. Likewise, the note will contrast the duties of the bank director with
those of other corporate directors. With this background, a suggested
framework for the duties of bank counsel will be developed. This section
will draw upon analogies to agency and tort case law. Professional codes
of conduct also provide guidance in defining the bank counsel's duties.
Finally, several of the FDIC's, RTC's and OTS's charges against
bank counsel will be evaluated in light of the bank counsel duties as set
forth in this note.
I conclude that bank counsel are not subject to a higher standard of
duty than other corporate counsel. However, they may have a broader
scope of duty than their non-banking counterparts. This broader duty is
a function of the public's interest in a safe banking industry and the
higher standards of duty to which bank directors are held. The FDIC,
RTC and OTS complaints reviewed in this note are consistent, for the
most part, with the suggested framework for bank counsel duties.
II. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE SCOPE OF BANK ATTORNEYS'
DUTIES
The contours of the bank attorney's duty is formed in part by the
nature of the banking system. Each banking client is a part of an inte-
grated system upon which the nation's economy is heavily dependent.
There exists a strong public interest in maintaining the stability of that
system. Thus, public policy exerts a strong influence on the operation of
banks, as well as the myriad of legal relationships that exist within the
entire banking system. This influence is manifested by the comprehen-
sive regulations governing banking and the higher standards of conduct
required of bank directors. Bank counsel must consider these public in-
terest factors when providing advice to their bank clients.
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A. Public Policy In Support of a Strong Banking System
The nation's banking system, which includes commercial banks,
savings and loans associations and credit unions, 16 serves many vital
functions in our nation's economy. The banking system is an intermedi-
ary of funds between savers and borrowers. 17 Banks meet the credit
needs of their communities by providing mortgage and consumer credit
and business loans.' 8 They provide a safe haven for the savings of many
people since deposits under $100,000 are guaranteed by the FDIC. In
addition, banks form the basis of the nation's payments system. The effi-
cient processing of checks and electronic funds transfers facilitates the
flow of money and credit throughout the world.' 9 Finally, the Federal
Reserve System controls the nation's money supply through the banking
system.20
Bank failures can severely impact the workings of this highly inte-
grated system. Each of the above functions is disrupted to some degree
by a bank failure. Of course, the system can absorb some relatively mi-
nor, inevitable bank failures. 2' However, as the number of failures across
the nation increases, so does the adverse impact on the economy. Like-
wise, failures of larger institutions have a broader effect on the economy.
The massive number of bank and S&L failures experienced in the 1980s
and 1990s have indeed negatively affected the economy. 22
16. Unless noted otherwise, commercial banks, savings and loan associations and credit unions
will be referred to in this comment as "banks."
17. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, THE ROLE
OF A NATIONAL BANK DIRECTOR 1 (1987) [hereinafter THE DIRECTOR's BOOK].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Some failures are good for the system, particularly if they represent the institution's inabil-
ity to compete in the marketplace. Neither the banking system nor local economies are benefitted by
poorly managed institutions which are focused on survival rather than growth and prosperity.
22. Recent estimates of the cost of the savings and loan crisis have ranged from $50 billion to
over $500 billion. See Douglas D. Evanoff, Subordinated Debt Can Be Key to Bank Reform; By
Imposing Market Discipline, It Would Shield the Insurance Fund, AM. BANKER, Dec. 26, 1991, at 6;
Barbara A. Rehm, RTC Downsizes Bailout Estimate; Pice Tag of $130 Billion Foreseen for S & L
Debacle, AM. BANKER, May 19, 1992, at 13; Bill Atkinson, Senate Banking Panel Backs $25 Billion
in RTC Funding; Committee Rejects New-Powers Amendments, AM. BANKER Mar. 25, 1992, at 2;
Murray Cohen, S & L Debacle Doesn't Justify Making a Mess of the Cleanup, AM. BANKER, Jan. 29,
1992, at 4. The balance of the FDIC's Bank Insurance Fund was a deficit $7 billion at year end
1991. GAO Confirms FDIC $7 Billion Figure for 1991 BIF Deficit; Looks at Fund's Future, 58
BANKING REP. (BNA) 1035 (June 15, 1992).
In addition to significantly increasing the nation's already huge deficit, bank failures cause other
harm to the economy. Financial institution failures have also resulted in depressed real estate values
in several parts of the country. The RTC, as liquidator of failed savings and loan associations, is the
owner of approximately $17 billion of real estate. R TC Defends Itself, Rejects 'Mind-Boggling' Sales
Alternative, AM. BANKER, Feb. 6, 1992, at 4 (letter to editor by Stephen J. Katsanos, Director,
corporate communications, RTC). The RTC is charged with selling these properties. In over-built
areas, where much of this real estate is located, the market will be unable to absorb these properties
1992]
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It is not surprising then that the banking system is subject to a com-
plex and comprehensive scheme of governmental regulation. 23 All as-
pects of banking are governed to some degree by federal or state
regulation. One purpose of this regulatory scheme is to minimize bank
failures and their impact on the economy. 24 Although Congress and
many state legislatures began to deregulate banking to some extent in the
early 1980s, that trend has been dramatically reversed since 1989. Pri-
marily in response to the savings and loan crisis and the insolvency of the
FDIC insurance fund, Congress passed two broad banking bills, the Fi-
nancial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
("FIRREA") 25 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA").26 The banking system has never
before been subject to such comprehensive federal regulation as it is now.
Banking laws and regulations are numerous. Many of the laws and
regulations are designed to protect the consumer.27 Others are intended
to ensure efficiency within the banking system.28 But the most significant
body of banking laws and regulations are designed to ensure the safety,
soundness and stability of banks.29 Examples of these types of laws in-
clude limitations on loans to one borrower, 30 limitations on loans to in-
siders,3' limitations on transactions between affiliates, 32 and minimum
capital requirements. 33 However, compliance with these laws and regu-
lations does not preclude the possibility of a bank's failure, although non-
for a number of years. Applying the basic economic law of supply and demand, the massive volume
of properties on the market will likely have a depressing effect on real estate values for a number of
years.
Large numbers of bank failures also contribute to fears over the stability of the entire economy.
Furthermore, weaknesses in the American banking system impair its competitiveness in worldwide
markets.
23. See generally KENNETH SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTA-
TION, AND EFFECTS (3d ed. 1990).
24. Id. at 7-8.
25. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, 103 Stat. 183 [hereinafter FIRREA].
26. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242,
105 Stat. 2236 [hereinafter FDICIA].
27. SPONG, supra note 23, at 145-80.
28. Id. at 99-142
29. Id. at 49-96.
30. 12 U.S.C.A. § 84 (1991). Generally, loans by a national bank to one borrower are limited
to 15% of bank capital. 12 C.F.R. § 32 provides regulations setting forth exceptions to the statute
and criteria for combining loans to separate borrowers for purposes of the statute.
31. 12 C.F.R. § 215 (1991). Regulation 0 provides reporting requirements and dollar limita-
tions on loans to directors, officers and principal shareholders.
32. 12 U.S.C.A. § 371c-1 (1991). Loans to each affiliate of a national bank limited to 10% of
the bank's capital. Aggregate loans to all affiliates limited to 20% of capital. All loans are required
to be collateralized within certain loan-to-value ratios, depending upon the nature of the collateral.
33. 12 C.F.R. § 3 (1991). The best rated national banks must maintain a minimum leverage
ratio 3% of total assets. Lower rated institutions must have leverage ratios at least 100 basis points
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compliance may indeed contribute to a failure. 34
Banks must exercise safe and sound banking practices in order to
ensure profitable, ongoing operations. Failure to adhere to safe and
sound banking practices may result in losses and even insolvency. By
engaging in unsafe and unsound banking practices, bank directors and
officers breach their fiduciary duty of care to the institution, its share-
holders and its depositors.
What precisely are unsafe and unsound banking practices has not
been specifically enumerated. 35 However, bank regulators provide gui-
dance in this regard through publications, periodic banking bulletins and
circulars, and banking advisories.36 Regulators also communicate di-
rectly with directors and officers about unsafe and unsound practices
during examinations and other supervisory contacts. Examples of prac-
tices which may be unsafe and unsound include advancing loans without
adequate analysis of repayment capacity, placing too much reliance on
collateral values in granting loans, and having an excessive concentration
of loans to one industry.37
Clearly, banks fail for many reasons. The Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency ("OCC") has determined that adverse economic factors
play only a small role in the failure of financial institutions.38 Fraud is
also not a major factor in the failures. 39 Rather, poor management, inad-
equate supervision by directors, and non-fraudulent insider abuse are the
primary causes of bank failures. 4° In particular, failed bank managers
higher. In addition, all national banks must maintain a minimum tier 1 capital to risk-weighted
assets ratio of 4% and a total capital to risk-weighted assets ratio of 8%.
34. See generally, OFFICEOF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK FAILURE, AN
EVALUATION OF THE FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE OF NATIONAL BANKS (1988)
[hereinafter FAILED BANK STUDY]. This is a study of national bank failures during the period 1979
through 1987. The study was based on an analysis of 171 failed banks,51 rehabilitated banks which
had experienced significant difficulties from which they recovered, and 38 healthy banks which
served as a control group.
35. An unsafe and unsound practice is:
one in which (1) there has been some conduct, whether act or omission, (2) which is con-
trary to accepted standards of prudent banking operation, and (3) which might result in
exposure of the bank or its shareholders to abnormal risk of loss.
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CIVIL MONEY PENALTIES, POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES MANUAL, PPM-5000-7 (rev.) (Attachment 2, at 4) (April 8, 1991) [hereinafter CIVIL
MONEY PENALTIES].
36. See e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INCOME DIVERSION
THROUGH MANAGEMENT AND OTHER FEES, Banking Circular 115 (Aug. 30, 1978) (stating that
the payment of fees to insiders which bear no relationship to the type, level, quality or value of the
goods or services provided represents an unsafe and unsound banking practice.)
37. See generally, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S
HANDBOOD FOR NAT'L BANK EXAMINERS § 205.1 .[hereinafter COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK].
38. FAILED BANK STUDY, supra note 34, at 10.
39. Id. at 9.
40. Id. at 1.
1992]
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were more likely to have violated laws and regulations, engaged in unsafe
and unsound practices and breached their fiduciary duty than the manag-
ers of healthy banks.4' Leading contributing factors to bank failures in-
clude nonexistent or poorly followed loan policies (this characteristic was
noted in 81% of failed banks), missing financial information on borrow-
ers or poor collateral documentation (81%), inadequate systems to en-
sure compliance with policies and banking laws (69%), inadequate
controls or supervision of key bank officers (63%), collateral-based lend-
ing and insufficient cash flow analysis (55%), unwarranted concentra-
tions of loans to one industry (37%), and self-dealing by insiders
(35%).42
The OCC concluded from its analysis of failed banks that the best
way for banks to weather economic storms is to minimize internal short-
comings. 43 Not surprisingly, the difference between the failed banks and
the healthy banks in the study was the quality of management. The
study also emphasized the importance of an active and informed board of
directors to the safety and success of banks." Those management teams
which avoided unsafe and unsound banking practices and fulfilled their
fiduciary duties to the bank, its shareholders and depositors survived eco-
nomic downturns and remained viable financial institutions. Those that
failed in this regard were more likely to see their institution fail as well.
Congress has recently enacted laws which recognize the importance
of the avoidance of unsafe and unsound banking practices and breaches
of fiduciary duties. FIRREA expanded the scope of federal bank regula-
tors' civil enforcement authority to cover breaches of fiduciary duty and
unsafe and unsound practices engaged in by institution-affiliated par-
ties.45 FDICIA goes even further by requiring that the bank regulators
implement regulations for certain bank operations such as loan under-
writing, compensation, and funds management." Such regulation will in
effect be a codification of certain safe and sound banking practices.
Notwithstanding the new regulations to be promulgated under
FDICIA, mere compliance with banking laws and regulations will not
insure against losses or insolvency. Generally, safety and soundness laws
and regulations define only minimally or maximally acceptable behavior.
At the edge of legal bank activity often lies a grey area of possible unsafe
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id. at 6-9.
43. Id. at 15-16.
44. Id. at 15.
45. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818 (1991). Prior to FIRREA, civil money penalties could only be assessed
for violations of certain enumerated laws and regulations. See also Kawaski, supra note 8, at 255-65.
46. FDICIA, supra, note 26 (Section 112).
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and unsound practice. For example, it may be legal for a bank with a
legal lending limit of $1,000,000 to loan $999,999 to one borrower. How-
ever, it may be an unsafe and unsound practice if the bank granted the
loan without first analyzing the borrower's repayment capacity. In that
case, the directors would have breached their fiduciary duty of care to
the bank by approving such a loan.
Bank directors and officers rely heavily on the attorney to guide
them through the maze of legal issues impacting day-to-day banking
business. As a result, bank attorneys often play decisive roles in the
health and stability of the institutions that they advise.47 The bankers
must be concerned with more than mere compliance with laws and regu-
lations. Legal issues include duties owed by directors and officers to the
bank, the shareholders and the depositors. And those duties necessarily
include adherence to safe and sound banking practices. Thus, the attor-
ney's advice will impact broadly upon the operations of the institution.
B. Special Duties of Bank Directors
Bank attorneys must be keenly aware of the higher standards of care
to which the bank directors are held. The attorney's advice to the bank
must take into consideration the directors' duties to the institution. The
institution itself may be held liable by the regulators for unsafe and un-
sound practices or breaches of fiduciary duties by the directors and of-
ficers. 48 The bank may be assessed civil money penalties or be subjected
to an administrative order to cease and desist.49 Thus, the bank attorney
must be mindful of legal, but imprudent activity of the directors.
The advice of corporate attorneys to their client is highly dependent
upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the subject matter of the
advice. Corporate attorneys are called upon to advise corporate directors
and officers as to alternative courses of action. Often, the requested ad-
vice relates to the legality of a transaction or course of action, or whether
the client or its agents could incur liability as a result of such action. The
attorney must address more than whether a transaction is merely allowa-
ble under applicable law.
In order to provide adequate advice in such a situation, the attorney
must fully understand the legal relationships and duties between the cli-
ent, its directors, officers, shareholders, customers, and others. For ex-
47. Thrift Lawyers Can Be Regulated By OTS, Senior Agency Official Says, 56 BANKING REP.
(BNA) 1202 (June 24, 1991) (comments of OTS Chief Counsel Harris Weinstein).
48. See generally 12 U.S.C.A. § 1818 (1991).
49. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1818(b) and 1818(i) (1991).
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ample, a corporate attorney might advise a closely-held corporation
differently than a publicly-held corporation on the same matter. The ad-
vice might vary because of the differences in the legal relationships
among the officers, directors and shareholders in closely-held corpora-
tions and those in publicly-held corporations.50 Similarly, the special du-
ties of the bank director will significantly influence the advice of the bank
attorney.
Corporate directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the
organization and its shareholders. 51 These common law duties have
since been codified in many state corporation statutes. 52 A typical stat-
ute establishing a director's duties states that he must perform those
duties "in good faith and with that degree of care which an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances." 53
The courts have applied this same standard of duty to bank direc-
tors. Nevertheless, bank directors have been held to a stricter standard
of care than other corporate directors. 54 Liability for the breach of the
duty of care has been imposed upon bank directors more often than on
directors of other types of corporations. 55 The bank director is not in a
like situation with that of most other corporate directors. As noted
above, a bank is part of an integrated system that is critical to the na-
tion's economy. Courts have held bank directors to a higher standard of
care because banks are depositories for public money.56 Bank directors
are charged with a responsibility to see that depositors' funds are safely
and providently invested.57 Courts have also placed a higher duty on
50. In general, shareholders do not owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation. However, some
courts have held that shareholders in a closely-held corporation owe fiduciary duties to the corpora-
tion and other shareholders. See Hagshenas v. Gaylord, 557 N.E.2d 316, 322 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
The attorney must consider this significant difference in legal relationships when advising a closely-
held corporation.
51. Stephen A. Radin, The Director's Duty of Care Three Years After Smith v. Van Gorkom, 39
HASTINGS L.J. 707, 710 (1988).
52. Hugh F. Sharber, Note, A Realistic Duty of Care for Outside Bank Directors, 51 TENN. L.
REV. 569, 574 (1984).
53. N.Y. BUSINESS CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 1991).
54. Sharber, supra note 52, at 576-81. See also Gadd v. Pearson, 351 F. Supp. 895, 903
(D.C.M.D. Fla. 1972) (stating that officers and directors of banking corporations generally owe a
greater duty than other corporate officers and directors); Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385, 1388-89
(8th Cir. 1979) (noting that it is well settled that bank officers and directors owe fiduciary duties to
shareholders and depositors); Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 1938) (stating that a
bank is a quasi-governmental agency, not a private corporation in which shareholders alone are
interested); Hoehn v. Crews, 144 F.2d 665, 672 (10th Cir. 1944) (stating that bank directors owe a
"high degree of duty to the general public and stockholders").
55. Sharber, supra note 52.
56. See e.g. Broderick v. Marcus, 272 N.Y.S. 455, 461 (1934).
57. Id.
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bank directors because of the "quasi-public role that financial interests
serve."58 One in the position of a bank director must necessarily exercise
greater care than a non-bank director.
Generally, the duties of the bank director include an obligation to
provide for competent management, to monitor operations to ensure ade-
quate internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations and to
oversee business performance. 59 The following represent some of the
practices the FDIC has identified as forming the basis for negligence suits
against bank directors:
(1) self-dealing;
(2) imprudent or excessive lending practices;
(3) failure to adhere to applicable laws and regulations;
(4) failure to correct conditions or practices criticized by the
regulators;
(5) failure to properly supervise the institution;
(6) failure to require prudent internal procedures and controls;
(7) permitting the institution to operate without adequate liquidity or
capital; and
(8) failure to require prudent diversity in the institution's loans and
investments.6o
For the most part, the above represent breaches of the director's duty of
care. Furthermore, each of the above may be considered an unsafe and
unsound banking practice.
Directors are entitled to reasonably rely upon the advice of attor-
neys in carrying out their fiduciary duties. 61 in the highly regulated in-
dustry of banking, directors and officers often solicit the lawyer's advice.
Often that advice may have a material impact on the bank's overall oper-
ations and condition. This reliance, however, places a duty on the attor-
ney to the board consistent with her duty to the bank. Indeed, a bank
director may claim reasonable reliance on an attorney's advice as a de-
fense to a charge of negligence.
III. SPECIFIC DUTIES OF BANK COUNSEL
Thus far we have seen that there exists a strong public interest in
ensuring the stability of the banking system, that that system can be de-
stabilized by bank failures, and that most bank failures are caused by
poor management and inadequate board supervision. These supervisory
weaknesses often result in, or are manifested by, violations of banking
58. Sharber, supra note 52, at 576. See also Atherton v. Anderson, 99 F.2d at 888.
59. THE DIRECTOR'S BOOK, supra note 17 at 19-46.
60. Peter G. Weinstock, Director and Officers of Failing Banks: Pitfalls and Precautions, 106
BANKING L.J. 434, 443 (1989).
61. REVISED MODEL BusINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (1985).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
laws and regulations, unsafe and unsound banking practices and
breaches by directors of their fiduciary duties to the bank, its sharehold-
ers and its depositors. As a result of the public's special interest in a
sound banking system, bank directors are held to a higher standard of
care. As a result of these circumstances, it becomes clear that the bank
attorney assumes duties which differ from those of a non-bank corporate
lawyer.
This section of the note will focus on some of those duties which
influence the attorney's advice with respect to questionable banking ac-
tivity, i.e. activity which may be unsafe or unsound, a breach of a fiduci-
ary's duty, or a violation of law or regulation. These are the duties
which, if breached, could lead to significant losses and insolvency. While
I conclude that the bank attorney is not subject to higher standards than
other corporate attorneys, the bank attorney's duties are different. That
difference lies primarily in the bank attorney's duties with respect to po-
tential unsafe and unsound practices and breaches of directors' fiduciary
duties.
Bank attorneys, as do corporate lawyers, owe fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty to their clients. 62 The nature of these basic duties is
shaped by several sources, including agency, corporate and contract law,
as well as codes of professional conduct. Four of the most critical duties
of the bank attorney, in the context of questionable banking activity, are
(1) the duty to loyally represent the client, as opposed to the directors,
shareholders and officers; (2) the duty to advise on the entirety of the
transaction or course of conduct, which necessarily includes being aware
of possible unsafe and unsound practices and breaches of fiduciary duty;
(3) the duty to warn corporate agents of existing or planned violations of
law and regulation, unsafe and unsound practices, and breaches of fiduci-
ary duty; and (4) the duty to refrain from knowingly assisting in breaches
of others' fiduciary duties to the bank.
A. Duty to the Client
The bank attorney owes a duty to represent the interests of her cli-
ent-the bank. When an attorney is retained by a bank, her responsibili-
ties and loyalties are to the bank and not to the individual employees,
officers, or directors of the bank.63 This is a fundamental duty, yet one
62. See 7 AM. JUR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 119 (1980). See also Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 233 (2d Cir. 1977) (attorney's duty was tantamount to that of a
fiduciary or trustee); Ball v. Posey, 222 Cal. Rptr. 746, 749 (1986) (attorney-client relationship is
fiduciary relationship that should be of the highest character).
63. In re WPMK, Inc., 42 B.R. 157, 162 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1984) (relying on HAWAII CODE OF
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that may be difficult to distinguish in the corporate context. The attor-
ney must deal with the corporation through its agents-the directors and
officers. Yet the interests of those corporate agents may be different
from, indeed adverse to, those of the corporation. This conflict is exacer-
bated when the organization is closely held.64 The corporate attorney
must be mindful of such potential conflicts and ensure that her represen-
tation of the organization is not compromised. The bank attorney is
often faced with this challenge, since a large number of the nation's fi-
nancial institutions are either closely held or controlled by a single major
shareholder.
B. Duty to Advise on Entirety of Transaction
The bank attorney has a duty to provide the bank with competent
advice based upon her informed judgement on the totality of a transac-
tion or proposed activity. In other words, the bank attorney must not
limit her advice to whether a particular transaction is legal and enforcea-
ble. Nor should an attorney structure a transaction so as to meet mini-
mum legal requirements without considering non-legal factors. 65 Rather,
bank counsel must advise her client as to the possibility of whether the
transaction may be a breach of another's fiduciary duty or an unsafe and
unsound banking practice. In order to be able to provide such advice,
the attorney may have to inquire or investigate as to the context of the
transaction.
This is not to say that the bank attorney is responsible for ensuring
the safety and soundness of the institution. Banks are in the business of
taking risk. It is the board's responsibility to ensure that risk is prudent
and properly managed.66 The board's acceptance of too much risk or the
failure to measure, monitor, mitigate and control risk is unsafe and un-
sound and a breach of their fiduciary duty. The directors have a duty to
establish policies, procedures and systems designed to manage risk.67
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18). See also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.13 (1988).
64. Consider a bank owned 100% by one individual. The interests of the bank and the individ-
ual would be different, even though there are no other shareholders. The bank's reliance on deposi-
tors' funds creates differing interests for the bank and its officers and directors. Thus, a sole
shareholder of a bank would not be able to borrow from the bank at preferential rates. However, the
sole shareholder of a hardware store may be entitled to borrow excess funds from the business at
lower than market rates. The banker has to answer to the depositors; the hardware store owner need
only answer to himself.
65. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1.
66. Risk Management, at 1-2 (1992) (unpublished pamphlet prepared by the Central District
office of the Comptroller of the Currency, available upon request from the Central District office).
67. Id.
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The attorney's duty is not to assess the risk. But the bank attorney
should advise the bank of the need for risk management systems. 68 In
addition, the attorney must advise of weaknesses in, or non-adherence to
such systems, if reasonably aware of such activity.69 Indeed, by virtue of
the wide range of banking matters requiring legal advice, the attorney is
often in a unique position to know how the bank actually operates in
relation to how policy states it ought to operate.
Many courts have taken a broad view of the attorney's duty to the
client.70 These courts have held that the attorney is more than a mere
scrivener. 71 He has a duty to look beyond the client's instructions, to
investigate matters under certain circumstances. 72 He must not remain
silent in the face of a client's legally unacceptable decisions. 73 Further-
more, he must ensure that the client is seeking a legitimate goal and using
legal means to get it.74
One of the broadest views of the attorney's duty was set forth in
Bryan v. Bartlett75 when the court held that an attorney representing a
failed consumer finance company served in the same fiduciary capacity as
the directors. 76 Under such a holding, the bank attorney might owe a
special duty of care to the institution and to the depositors. The attorney
would be expected to look beyond the instant transaction and be alert to
irregularities.
In FDIC v. Wise, a legal malpractice suit against the attorneys of a
failed S&L, the attorney-defendants argued in a motion to dismiss that
68. See Harris Weinstein, Chief Counsel, OTS, Remarks at the U.S. League of Savings Institu-
tions Annual Attorney's Conference, at 4-5 (July 11, 1991) (available from OTS Publications).
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., In re Blatt, 65 N.J. 539 (1974); Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666 (D.D.C.
1989); In re Consupak, Inc., 87 B.R. 529 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). See also, Cherokee Restaurant,
Inc. v. Pierson, 428 So. 2d 995, 997-98 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the attorney's duty of care is
imposed by law and is something over and above any contractual duty). But see Johnson v. Jones,
652 P.2d 650 (Idaho 1982). In Johnson, the court held that an attorney, retained to draw up a
contract for the purchase of a business, owed no duty to advise the client as to the need for an
inventory of corporate assets or as to their rights to receive certain assets withheld by the seller. Id.
at 652. The court stated that the scope of an attorney's contractual duty to a client is defined by the
purposes for which the attorney is retained. Id.
71. 705 F. Supp. at 678-80. The court held that the attorney owes a continuing fiduciary duty
to the client, even though he was not expressly retained in connection with a particular transaction.
72. 87 B.R. at 549-51. The court interpreted Canon 7 of the Code and Rule 2.1 of the Rules to
require an attorney to offer legal advice, on their own initiative, when either the client is unaware of
the potential adverse legal consequences of its planned action or when it is in the client's best
interest.
73. Id. at 551.
74. 65 N.J. at 545. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in its review of an attorney disciplinary
action, held that an attorney may not follow the client's directions without first ensuring that the
client is seeking a legitimate goal and is using legal means to attain it.
75. 435 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1970) cert denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971).
76. Id. at 37.
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they had no duty to advise, investigate or inquire into the client's im-
proper activities.77 The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss 7a
and it concluded that the facts might support the claim that the attorneys
owed a duty to advise and investigate certain matters.79
These cases strongly suggest that bank counsel have a duty to advise
on the legality and propriety of transactions in their totality. They sup-
port the concept of "whole law" promoted by OTS Chief Counsel Harris
Weinstein.80 The principle of "whole law," according to Weinstein,
means determining whether transactions, which are legal when viewed in
isolation, may pose safety, soundness, or fiduciary considerations. 8 The
"whole law" principle is a comprehensive view of technical regulatory
standards, concepts of safety and soundness, concepts of fiduciary duty,
and hostility toward law-avoidance schemes.8 2
The "whole law" concept applies particularly well to fiduciary rela-
tionships. In Garner v. Pearson, the court stated that the entire course of
dealing between a fiduciary and beneficiary is governed by the standards
of good faith and fairness.8 3 In holding that a certain transaction caused
by fiduciaries of a bank was a sham and therefore void, the court looked
not at the separate related transactions but to the entire course of dealing
between the fiduciaries and the bank.84
Rule 2.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states that
when rendering advice, "a lawyer may refer not only to the law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political fac-
tors, that may be relevant to the client's situation."' 85 The comments to
this rule address the possible inadequacies of purely technical legal ad-
vice. According to the comments, overly narrow and technical advice
may be inadequate or of little value to the client.8 6 Even when a client
inexperienced in legal matters asks for purely technical advice, the com-
ment suggests that the attorney might have a responsibility to indicate
that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations. 87 If the
77. FDIC v. Wise, 758 F. Supp. 1414, 1418 (D. Colo. 1991).
78. Id. at 1419.
79. Id.
80. Advice on How to Exploit Loopholes May Be Unethical, OTY' Weinstein Says, 56 BANKING
REP. (BNA) 616 (April 1, 1991).
81. Id. at 617.
82. Id.
83. 545 F. Supp. 549, 558 (M.D. Fla. 1982).
84. Id. at 561.
85. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1988). Accord Wolfrich Corp. v.
United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 197 Cal. Rptr. 446, 449 (1983) overruled on other grounds by Doctors' Co.
v. Superior Ct., 775 P.2d 508 (Cal. 1989).
86. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 cmt. 2 (1988).
87. Id. at cmt. 3 (1988).
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lawyer is asked for advice that goes well beyond legal matters and re-
quires the expertise of other professionals, the lawyer should recommend
that the client consult with the appropriate professional.,,
In a bank's situation, it is critical that the attorney's advice be as
broad as possible. As noted above, mere legal compliance does not pro-
tect the interests of the bank.89 When asked for advice, the attorney
should address more than the narrow aspects of a particular transaction.
The advice should encompass potential safety and soundness issues or
possible breaches of fiduciary duties.
This is not to say that the attorney must identify and advise on every
possible unsafe and unsound banking practice or potential breach of
duty. Rather, the attorney must identify any such improprieties or im-
prudent practices to which she has reasonably been put on notice.9° Fur-
thermore, where the attorney is not on notice of any particular problem,
she should nevertheless advise the bank that safety and soundness factors
must be evaluated in deciding whether to take a proposed action.
An important distinction must be made regarding the bank attor-
ney's duty as an advisor to provide advice to the client and the attorney's
duty as an advocate to zealously represent the interests of the client. The
advocate generally deals with past conduct.9 1 She must take the facts as
she finds them.92 As an advocate, the attorney should resolve doubts as
to questions of law in the client's favor.93 The advocate may urge any
88. Id. at cmt. 4 (1988).
89. See discussion infra part II.A.
90. See Owen v. Neely, 471 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Ky. 1971) (if lawyer accidentally or otherwise
receives information that should reasonably put him on notice of a defect, it is his duty to investigate
or report it to his client).
Consider the example of the bank attorney preparing the closing documents for a loan to the
chairman's business partner to finance the purchase of some vacant real estate. The potential for a
conflict between the chairman's interests and the client's interests may be enough to alert the attor-
ney to possible improprieties. Furthermore, suppose the attorney's review of the title insurance
reveals the property had been sold ten times in the last week. This latter information would defi-
nitely place a duty on the attorney to inquire further into the transaction.
These facts suggest a land-swap transaction, where title to a property is exchanged among con-
spirators, including the banker, in a string of sales transactions only for the purpose of creating an
inflated appraised value. The property is sold at a higher artificial price at each successive sale, with
each sale financed in full by the "seller." Once the "value" has been pushed up by these sales, an
appraiser can assign a market value to the property based solely on its previous sales price. Once the
artificially increased value has been "affirmed" by an appraiser, the property can be used as collateral
for a loan many times in excess of the property's true value. A fraction of the loan proceeds goes to
pay off the original loan to purchase the property, the rest is shared among the conspirators. The
bank is harmed in that it has advanced funds well in excess of the collateral value, and often beyond
the repayment capacity of the perpetrators.
91. Dean Marsan, Tax Shelter Opinionr Ethical Responsibilities of the Tax Attorney, 9 OHIo
N.U. L. REv. 237, 239 (1982).
92. Id.
93. Id at 239-40.
[Vol. 68:517
ADVISING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
permissible construction of the law favorable to her client whether or not
the attorney believes the construction will prevail.94
The role of the advisor is much different. The advisor assists the
client in determining future courses of action and relationships.9" The
advising lawyer must inform the client of all relevant considerations if
the client is to decide how to proceed. 96 Thus, the advisor carries a heav-
ier burden and must be more objective than the advocate. 97
Working in a regulated environment, the bank attorney is some-
times an advisor and sometimes an advocate. On occasion, the attorney
may be requested on behalf of the bank to contest the regulator's citation
of a violation of law. Under those circumstances, the attorney assumes
the role of advocate. Her duty is to zealously put forth a position which
casts the best light on the alleged violation. At other times the attorney
may be asked for advice on future activity, such as documenting a loan
transaction, structuring a new operating subsidiary, or drafting a conflict
of interest policy. In those instances the attorney serves as advisor to the
bank. Her duty will be to advise the bank as to the legal aspects of the
proposed activity, as well as any safety and soundness and fiduciary duty
issues of which the attorney is reasonably aware.
The distinction between the two roles is not necessarily the subject
matter. Rather, the question of which role the attorney must fill-advo-
cate or advisor-often turns on whether the events underlying the repre-
sentation have already occurred. While this seems to be a clear
distinction, the line becomes blurred when considering the attorney's in-
volvement in the bank's reporting of certain past transactions to the reg-
ulator or responding to the regulator's requests for information about
past events.
The American Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics,
in Opinion 314, addressed this question as it relates to a tax attorney
advising her client in preparing his tax return.98 The Opinion states that
the preparation of a tax return is an adversary situation and that the tax
attorney is in an advocate role.99 By analogy, this Opinion suggests that
a bank attorney advising his client on regulatory reporting require-
ments"0° might also be deemed to be in an advocate role.
94. Id. at 240.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
99. Id.
100. For purposes of this discussion, regulatory reporting requirements include routine financial
reporting, such as the reports of income and condition submitted quarterly to the FDIC, as well as
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The "reporting requirements" owed to the IRS, however, are clearly
distinguishable from the regulatory reporting requirements of banks.
The tax return is used by the IRS for the purpose of determining the
amount of tax owed.' 0 The IRS has no interest in the filer's behavior
which produced the reported revenues and expenses. It is only con-
cerned that those revenues and expenses are reported correctly-so that
the amount of the tax is correct. By aggressively taking a position most
favorable to the client, the advocate/tax attorney is benefitting the client
by minimizing the tax liability. The advocacy role of the tax advisor
seems appropriate in this context, even though the attorney is advising as
to a future event-the filing of a tax return.
But regulators use the information they request of banks in the su-
pervision of those institutions. Moreover, some of that information is
used by the public in evaluating the condition of the bank. 0 2 Both uses
serve as corporate monitoring devices. Unlike the IRS agent, the regula-
tor, depositors, investors and others are specifically interested in the
bank's behavior. Certain required reports assist the regulator and others
in understanding that behavior. Regulator-required reports are often
designed to enable the reader to identify financial weaknesses, unsafe and
unsound activity, violations of law, and other matters critical to the su-
pervision of the institutions.
In this regard, the preparation of regulatory reports or responses to
regulatory requests are more akin to the reporting requirements of the
Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 than the IRS tax re-
turns.103 These laws prescribe standards of liability for material mis-
statements or omissions in required reports to shareholders. 0 4 Under
certain circumstances, attorneys involved in the preparation of required
reports can be held liable for violations of the acts or for aiding and abet-
specific regulator requests for information which will be used in the bank examination process. The
latter may include requests for listings of problem loans, listings of insider loans, allowance for loan
loss analyses, board minutes, etc.
101. See MERTENS LAW OF FED. TAX § 47.03 (1992).
102. In particular, the quarterly reports of income and condition are often relied upon by deposi-
tors, shareholders, stock analysts, regulators, and other interested parties to provide an insight into
the financial condition of financial institutions. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK FOR NAT'L BANK EXAMINERS, § 408. 1. These reports include a bal-
ance sheet and income statement, as well as other schedules and listings. Examples of available
information include past due and non-accrual loan statistics, number of insider loans granted during
the period, and various breakdowns of deposits. Id.
103. The primary objectives of the securities laws are to promote disclosure, which would enable
investors to make informed investment decisions, deter fraud, and bolster confidence in the market.
Steven M. Abramowitz, Note, Disclosure Under the Securities Laws: Implications for the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 456, 464-65 (1990).
104. JEFFREY M. SMITH, PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 74-76 (1981).
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ting another's violation.10 5 Attorneys that assist in the preparation of
these reports serve in an advisory role. The securities attorney is not
considered to be in an adversarial role with the shareholders. Rather, the
shareholders, and thus the corporation, are the beneficiaries of the pro-
tections afforded by securities laws. 0 6
Similarly, the bank attorney that assists in the preparation of regula-
tory reports or responses to regulatory requests for information is per-
forming an advisory function. She should not approach the
representation from an advocate's point of view. As such, the attorney in
this position should provide objective advice which addresses all aspects
of the reporting, including the need to state material facts which might
result in a less than favorable regulatory response. It should be left to the
client to choose a course of action based upon that objective advice.
If the attorney advising on the preparation of regulatory reports
were to take an advocate's role, he might seek to minimize the impact of
past improprieties in those reports. As a result, regulators or others who
may use such reports might be unable to recognize weaknesses in the
institution. Improprieties might continue uncontrolled and ultimately
the bank could be harmed. Therefore, the interests of the bank and the
public would be at risk if the bank attorney did not assume an advisory
role when assisting in the preparation of regulatory reports.
C. Duty to Warn and Advise the Bank
Once the bank attorney has learned of potential violations of law or
regulation, breaches of fiduciary duty, or unsafe and unsound banking
practices, she has a duty to warn the corporate agents of such activity.
The attorney's fiduciary duty embraces the obligation of full and fair dis-
closure to the bank of facts which materially affect its rights and inter-
ests.10 7 Indeed, the attorney has a duty to disclose anything known to
her which might affect the client's decision on whether or how to act. 0 8
This duty is the corollary to the directors' right to rely upon the advice
and expertise of the attorney.10 9 To allow the directors to rely upon the
attorney, without requiring the attorney to provide them with all rele-
105. Id. at 76-77.
106. Abramowitz, supra note 103, at 464-65.
107. Ball v. Posey, 222 Cal. Rptr. 746, 749 (1986). See also Zidell V. Bird, 692 S.W.2d 550, 553
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that negligence may consist of an attorney's failure to inform the
client); Collins v. Fitzwater, 560 P.2d 1074, 1077 (Or. 1977) (upholding trial court's finding that
attorney was negligent in failing to advise the board that they could incur liability if unregistered
securities were sold).
108. Musselman v. Willoughby Corp., 337 S.E.2d 724, 728 (Va. 1985).
109. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(b) (1991).
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vant data upon which they can make an informed judgement, would
make such reliance unwarranted and unwise.
Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct establishes
guidelines for the corporate attorney when he becomes aware of impro-
prieties."10 However, Rule 1.13 is "riddled with qualifying language"
which limits the attorney's duties when aware of improper activity."'
One of the major qualifications of Rule 1.13 is that the improper activity
must be a matter related to the attorney's representation. It has been
suggested that this limitation was designed to discourage attorneys from
officiously interfering in corporate affairs, even if the activity was serious
and client-threatening, as long as the impropriety was outside of the mat-
ter on which the attorney was providing advice.' 12
In addition, the ultimate course of action recommended by Rule
1.13, reporting the activity to the board of directors, effectively makes the
board, rather than the corporation, the ultimate client. Under certain
circumstances, such as when the board of directors has breached its fidu-
ciary duties, this course of action may undermine the intent of the rule.
It is in these situations that the entity is most in need of the protection of
the attorney since advice to the perpetrators of improper activity might
fall on deaf ears." 3 Another recommended course of action is to resign
from the representation.
Notwithstanding some of the shortcomings of Rule 1.13, it does pro-
vide guidance for the attorney on possible courses of action. 14 When
aware of improper activity, the attorney should advise the board of direc-
tors and refuse to lend assistance in furtherance of the activity." 5 Re-
signing from the representation may be necessary if the board is a party
to the improprieties or the client insists on legal assistance to further the
activity in spite of the attorney's advice against it.I16 While these courses
of action may be unproductive in many corporate scenarios, the banking
situation is much different. Unlike most corporations, banks are subject
to frequent examinations by their regulators. The resignation of an attor-
ney or the presence of an attorney's memo regarding noted improprieties
might never be noticed by anyone outside a non-bank corporation. How-
ever, examiners are more likely to learn of such actions during examina-
110. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1988).
111. Villa & Murphy, supra note 15, at 296.
112. Id. at 297 (quoting CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcS 744 (1986)).
113. James R. McCall, The Corporation as Client: Problems Perspectives, and Partial Solutions,
39 HASTINGS L.J. 623, 638 (1988).
114. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1988).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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tions. Indeed, hints of this nature are red flags for bank examiners that
would likely prompt some regulatory follow-up.
It is important to note that the bank attorney generally has no duty
to disclose possible improper activity to the bank regulators. Some crit-
ics of the FDIC, RTC and OTS have claimed that the receivers and regu-
lators are holding the attorneys to a duty to make such disclosures.11 7
Indeed, there has been a great deal written in the press about the bank
attorney's duty to "blow the whistle" on their clients.'1 8 To the con-
trary, such disclosure would be a breach of the attorney's duty to protect
the client's confidences.
The nature of the attorney-client relationship is based upon the prin-
ciples of agency law.119 As such, agency law establishes the attorney's
duty to protect the client's confidences. Client confidences are also pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege, which is based upon rules of evi-
dence.120 State standards of professional conduct provide additional
guidance on the issue of client confidentiality.1 21
The attorney, as an agent, is under a duty not to use or communi-
cate information confidentially given her by the principal or acquired
during the course of the agency, unless there is an agreement to the con-
trary. 122 However, an agent is privileged to reveal confidential informa-
tion in the protection of a superior interest in herself or a third person. 123
Thus, under the law of agency, an agent would be free to reveal that the
principal is committing or is about to commit a crime. However, the
agent is not required to make such a revelation.
The attorney-client privilege also restricts the attorney's ability to
disclose certain client information.' 24 However, the privilege only pro-
tects information communicated to the attorney for the purpose of ob-
taining legal advice. For example, the privilege does not extend to
117. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g, Sherry R. Sontag, Two Twists to S&L Failout; The Duty of Lawyers to Blow the
Whistle on Clients is Unclear, NAT'L L. J, Sept. 17, 1990, at 3.
119. Note, The Attorney's Duty to Reveal a Client's Intended Future Criminal Conduct, 1984
DUKE L.J. 582, 590 [hereinafter Duty to Reveal].
120. Id. at 589.
121. See Victor H. Kramer, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations: A Study in Profes-
sional Irresponsibility, 67 GEO. L.J. 991, 994 (1979).
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1957).
123. Id. at cmt f.
124. The attorney-client privilege is defined by Wigmore as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal advisor in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
by the client, (5) are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by
the legal advisor, (6) except the privilege be waived.
JOHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENT'S TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 392-93 (1935).
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business advice given by an attorney to a client. 125 This exclusion may be
relevant in situations where an attorney gives advice on safety and sound-
ness matters. The attorney-client privilege also has a crime-fraud excep-
tion. 126 Communications made to the attorney for the purpose of
furthering a crime or a fraud are not protected.
Finally, state standards of professional responsibility establish limi-
tations on the attorney's ability to disclose client confidences. 127
In summary, the doctrines of agency and attorney-client privilege,
and the standards of professional conduct adopted by the states, would
not support claims of a bank attorney's duty to disclose the client's im-
proper activity to its regulator or other third parties. Rather, these
guidelines clearly establish a strong bias against attorney disclosure of
confidential client information. Exceptions to this bias are limited to sit-
uations in which the information relates to a client's planned criminal or
fraudulent acts. In many states, even those types of planned acts may
not be disclosed unless they might result in serious bodily injury. 128 In
some instances, the fraud exception to the prohibition may allow disclo-
sure in the context of a bank attorney-bank client relationship. But, in
125. Abramowitz, supra note 103, at 462. See also CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 88, at 209-10 (Edward Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
126. See Duty to Reveal, supra note 119, at 590.
127. See Kramer, supra note 121, at 994. Each state's rules of professional conduct set the
ethical standards for all members of the state's bar. The rules are adopted by the high courts of each
state and are generally based upon one or more of the several models of professional standards
established by the ABA. Thus, there is no one set of standards addressing the issue of disclosure of
client confidences. With respect to disclosure of client confidences, most states have adopted either
the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code), the ABA Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct (Model Rules), or the Revised Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Draft Rules). Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to
Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. LEGAL STuD. 123, 140
n.38 (1988).
The following is a summary of the ethical standards among the states regarding disclosure of
planned acts:
(i) Attorneys are generally not obligated to disclose planned acts of clients communicated
to them in confidence.
(ii) Attorneys in all states have the discretion to disclose clients' planned acts if the acts are
crimes threatening serious bodily injury; in most states, attorneys have the discretion to
disclose any type of crime or fraud.
(iii) Attorneys generally cannot disclose information about other planned acts, such as an
intention to commit a breach of contract or much behavior that could give rise to a tort.
Furthermore, in some states, attorneys cannot disclose information about any planned act
unless it is a crime threatening serious bodily injury.
(iv) However, an attorney's obligation not to disclose a planned act might not apply if he
gains his information inadvertently (for example, if he overhears his client talking to an-
other person), if a third party who would not be expected to maintain confidentiality is
present when the client speaks to the attorney, if the attorney has been drawn into assisting
an illegal act, or if the client waives the privilege of confidentiality. In such cases, attorneys
may have the discretion to disclose planned acts.
Id. at 140-141.
128. Shavell, supra note 127, at 140-41.
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most'states, a duty to disclose does not exist under these rules of law. 129
D. Duty to Refrain From Assisting Directors in Breaches of Their
Fiduciary Duty
We have seen that the bank attorney has a duty only to the client
bank, a duty to advise on the entirety of a transaction, and a duty to
warn the client of possible improper or imprudent activity. Rule 1.13
suggests, but does not dictate, some courses of action the attorney might
take when learning of certain illegal activity. One of those courses of
action is to advise the board of directors or other corporate agent of such
possible improprieties. 130 The attorney cannot fulfill his duty to the cli-
ent by superficially advising the corporate agents of the activity, and then
assisting those agents in carrying out that same activity. The bank attor-
ney must not knowingly assist in activity which represents a breach of a
fiduciary's duty to the bank.
A fiduciary who breaches any of the responsibilities imposed upon
him is personally liable for any damages arising from such breach. 13 1
Also, a third party who assists a fiduciary in a breach of duty is liable for
the harm caused. 132 The common law elements for a cause of action for
inducing or participating in a breach of fiduciary duty are (1) a breach by
a fiduciary of obligations to others, (2) knowing inducement or participa-
129. Notwithstanding the current state of the law regarding disclosure of client confidences, the
OTS has suggested that it may require S&L attorneys to disclose to the oTS certain information
relating to the client's violations, unsafe and unsound practices and breaches of fiduciary duty. OTS
Considering Policy on Requesting Information From Outside S&L Counsel, 57 BANKING REP. (BNA)
305 (Aug. 19, 1991). OTS Chief Counsel Weinstein has commented on the possibility of requiring
S&L attorneys to periodically submit a letter to the bank examiners which would include, among
other things:
1) a statement, "modeled on the securities disclosure advise paragraph standard to the
auditor's letter," that the lawyer has provided legal advice required to inform the client
that a transaction could constitute a violation of law, rule, or regulation, an unsafe or
unsound practice, or a breach of fiduciary duty, if those concerns are implicated; and
2) a statement that the lawyer sought review by the highest corporate authority where
management proposed to go forward with such a transaction and that the lawyer de-
clined to assist in any such transaction that nevertheless occurred.
Id. Such a policy would contradict longstanding policy against such disclosure. The purpose of
maintaining client confidences is that it encourages clients to seek out legal advice. Protection of
confidentiality should lead to socially desirable changes in behavior when parties seek legal advice
and the advice they obtain promotes such behavior. See Shavell, supra note 127.
However, under the proposed disclosure guidelines, S&L officers and directors might be dis-
couraged from seeking legal advice about potential unsafe and unsound practices. They may feel
safer proceeding without advice, placing the bank at risk in the process. Thus, the proposed disclo-
sure rules may encourage more risky behavior by bankers than might occur without the disclosures.
See Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F. 2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1475 (1992).
130. See discussion supra part III.C.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 401 (1957).
132. 3 Am. Jur. 2d AGENCY § 299 (1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 312 (1957);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874, cmt c (1979).
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tion by the defendant, (3) and damages resulting from the breach.1 33
The federal pension laws of ERISA give rise to much of the federal
case law regarding attorneys aiding and abetting breaches of fiduciary
duties. Federally-regulated pension plans serve as a good analogy to the
federally-insured banking system. Both are subject to federal regulations
intended to protect the saver. Directors of banks and trustees of pensions
each manage large sums of money for the benefit of depositors/benefi-
ciaries. They must exercise similar care in protecting those funds. Loans
and investments must be creditworthy, based on proper analysis, and
properly documented. Similarly, bank directors and pension trustees
must refrain from any self-dealing activity. And both the bank director
and pension trustee must rely heavily upon the advice of the attorney in
carrying out their fiduciary duties.
ERISA has effectively federalized the common law of trusts and in-
corporated the basic trust principle imposing liability on third-party non-
fiduciaries.134 Unfortunately, the federal courts have not been consistent
in defining the required elements of that liability. Some courts have held
that, under ERISA, a fiduciary can be found liable for aiding and abet-
ting a breach of fiduciary duty if it can be shown that he gave knowing
aid to the breach.' 35 Other courts have required a standard of knowing
and substantial aid. 136 Another has stated that the non-fiduciary defend-
ants must have conspired with the fiduciary.' 37 Yet another has opined
that the degree of participation required for a finding of liability need not
reach the level "of purposeful conduct necessary for a claim of assisting
in the perpetration of a fraud."' 38
The courts have let stand allegations against attorneys of aiding and
abetting breaches of fiduciary duty under ERISA for such actions as
making "deceptively incomplete representation(s)" to an insurance regu-
lator which had the effect of delaying the revelation of the fiduciary's
diversion of premiums.' 39 The drafting of documents effectuating a de-
ceptive transfer of funds also justified a claim of an attorney's conspiracy
to breach another's fiduciary duty. 140 On the other hand, the courts have
133. Whitney v. Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986).
134. Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1988) (Wiggins, C.J., concurring).
135. Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987). Cf In re
Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 9483, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at *25 (Del. Ch. Feb.
12, 1990) (holding investment banking firm's knowing participation in the directors' breaches of
fiduciary duty could reasonably be inferred from its involvement with the management group).
136. See Arakelian v. National Western Life Ins. Co., 748 F. Supp 17, 20 (D.D.C. 1990).
137. Thornton v. Evans, 692 F.2d 1064, 1078 n.34 (7th Cir. 1982).
138. Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1143, 1168 (D.D.C. 1986).
139. Thornton, 692 F.2d at 1070.
140. Id. at 1082.
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held that merely providing incorrect advice about the termination of a
pension plan would not meet the standard of conduct necessary for an
aiding and abetting claim.141
IV. FDIC, RTC AND OTS CLAIMS
The bank attorney has a fiduciary duty to her client. That duty is
broader than the duty of most corporate attorneys because of the stricter
standards to which bank directors are held and the public's interest in a
sound banking system. Four specific duties of the bank counsel have
been discussed in this note. According to the following four complaints
filed against the attorneys of several failed institutions, the defendant-
attorneys failed to fulfill one or more of those four duties. None of these
cases were fully adjudicated. All have been recently resolved by settle-
ment. Nevertheless, they illustrate the range of recent allegations being
made against bank attorneys in the wake of the savings and loan crisis.
A. FDIC v. Wise
In Wise, the FDIC alleged that the law firm of Sherman & Howard
aided and abetted the senior management of the Silverado S&L by,
among other things, assisting in the consummation of loans which vio-
lated federal loan limits to one borrower. 142 One example involves a $26
million loan to four partnerships controlled by two individuals. One
week after the loan was advanced, Bill Walters became a 50% partner in
each of the four partnerships. 143 Mr. Walters was already a major bor-
rower at the institution, owned a significant amount of preferred stock of
the institution's holding company, and was a business partner of several
of the institution's directors. 44 Had Walters been a partner prior to the
$26 million advance, the loan would have been a violation of the legal
limit on loans to Walters. 45 The FDIC alleged that Sherman & Howard
(a) knew that Walters would become a 50% partner shortly after the
loan was made, (b) that Walters' participation in the partnerships would
cause a violation of the lending limit, and (c) that Walters' involvement
in the partnerships was intentionally delayed in order to conceal the vio-
lation. 46 The FDIC further alleged that Sherman & Howard partici-
pated in the structuring of the loan and had negotiated the terms of the
141. Pappas v. Buck Consultants, Inc., 923 F.2d 531, 542 (7th Cir. 1991).
142. First amended complaint at 59, FDIC v. Wise (No. 90-1688).
143. Id. at 21.
144. Id. at 14.
145. Id. at 22.
146. Id. at 52-53.
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loan with Walters' counsel. 147 The loans to Walters subsequently went
into default and the institution incurred massive losses. This is just one
example of many similar type transactions described in the complaint.
Assuming the allegations are true, the defendant-attorneys breached
several of the four duties set forth above. First, they appeared to have
placed the interests of the directors and a preferred stock shareholder
over those of the bank. Mr. Walters benefitted while the growing con-
centration of loans to a financially-troubled borrower placed the bank at
greater risk. Furthermore, the FDIC alleged that the attorneys failed to
advise the board of directors about the potential lending limit violation,
and the safety and soundness implications of the transaction. To the
contrary, -the attorneys actively and knowingly participated with some of
the directors in the transaction, thus aiding and abetting a breach of
those directors' fiduciary duties to the bank.
B. RTC v. Keating
In Keating, the RTC alleged that certain directors and officers had
breached their fiduciary duties to Lincoln S&L by failing to comply with
statutes and regulations governing safe and sound lending and invest-
ment practices for insured savings and loan associations. 148 RTC further
alleged that the law firm of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue aided and abet-
ted the breaches of fiduciary duties by assisting and participating in the
violations. 149 Among other things, Jones Day allegedly assisted the hold-
ing company's attorneys in concealing vital and damaging information
from federal regulators 50 and helping the holding company attorneys
create after the fact ratifications for transactions not appropriately au-
thorized by the Lincoln board.15' The complaint also states that Jones
Day knew of illegal, prohibited and abusive transactions which were
harmful to Lincoln but designed to benefit the holding company and
others. 152 Jones Day not only failed to advise the Lincoln board of these
transactions, according to the RTC, but they counseled the perpetrators
on whether the regulators would discover the true nature of the deals.
Thus, they had provided assistance to the perpetrators in the conceal-
ment of the numerous improper transactions. According to the com-
plaint, Jones Day breached each of the four duties addressed above.
147. Id. at 52.
148. Third amended complaint at 17, RTC v. Keating (No. 89-1509 PHX-RMB).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 155.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 157.
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Also in Keating, the RTC alleged that the law firm of Troutman
Sanders, Lockerman & Ashmore had aided and abetted breaches of fidu-
ciary duties by their non-attorney codefendants.153 The complaint al-
leges that, among other things, the firm issued favorable opinion letters
which enabled the holding company ESOP to borrow $15 million, se-
cured by assets of Lincoln. 54 Troutman Sanders issued its opinion based
upon certain assumptions, certifications and opinion letters. According
to the RTC, Troutman Sanders either knew, had reason to believe, or
consciously avoided the knowledge that those assumptions and certifica-
tions were false, and that the transaction was designed to benefit certain
of the codefendants at the expense of Lincoln.' 55
These allegations suggest that the attorneys placed the interests of
others before those of the client. The attorneys did not advise the board
of the potential problems with the ESOP transaction. Moreover, their
issuance of the opinion letters assisted some of the directors in a breach
of their fiduciary duty to the bank.
C. FDIC v. Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott
The Eckert complaint focuses on the bank attorney's involvement in
a transaction between the principal shareholder and the bank. 56 The
transaction, labeled a "sham" by the FDIC,157 resulted in the bank's sale
of a mortgage subsidiary to a company controlled by the principal share-
holder. As a result of that transaction, the bank incurred substantial
losses which rendered it insolvent.' 58
One portion of the Eckert complaint alleged that the attorneys and
the principal shareholder went forward with a plan to divest of the
bank's mortgage subsidiary without notifying the OCC in advance, as
required by an OCC order. 59 Furthermore, the complaint alleged that
the attorneys structured the transaction to appear to have complied with
certain loan-to-affiliate restrictions, but was nevertheless unsafe and un-
sound and benefitted the principal shareholder at the expense of the
bank. 16
In 1986, the bank stipulated and consented to an OCC order to
153. Id. at 264.
154. Id. at 186.
155. Id. at 180-85.
156. Complaint, FDIC v. Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott (No. 90-0488).
157. Id. at 16.
158. Id. at 3-4.
159. Id. at 36.
160. Id. at 14-32.
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cease and desist. 161 The order required the bank to develop an alterna-
tive plan for the divestiture of its mortgage subsidiary. 162 The bank was
required to submit the plan to the OCC District Administrator for his
review and approval. The order also specified that the plan must involve,
at a minimum, a freezing of the level of credit exposure by the bank to
the former mortgage subsidiary.163
The bank submitted a plan to the OCC. However, that plan and all
subsequent amendments to the plan were rejected by the OCC. 164 Never-
theless, the bank subsequently sold the mortgage subsidiary to a shell
company owned by the bank's principal shareholder in a deal that "con-
tained all the objectionable features of the Alternative Plan rejected by
the OCC plus additional objectionable features." 165 Since the bank fi-
nanced the sale, it retained all of the risk of the subsidiary, yet lost all
control over its operations. 66
According to the FDIC, the bank's attorney was intimately involved
with the cease and desist order, development of the alternative plan and
amendments, other related negotiations with the OCC, the sale of the
subsidiary, and the sale of low quality assets to the bank. Furthermore,
the law firm acknowledged in internal memoranda its duty to advise the
directors of the "troublesome aspects of the proposed sale," 167 "that [the]
OCC might consider any divestiture made without their approval to vio-
late the spirit, if not the letter, of the C&D order,"' 168 that the transaction
"constitutes an "insider" transaction that falls under the purview of vari-
ous statutory and common-law restrictions on self-dealing,"' 69 that the
loan to finance the transaction posed questions under "12 U.S.C. §§ 24,
371c, 375a, and 375b, dealing with lending limits, and again under the
common-law duty of loyalty"'170 and that "an independent appraisal of a
major asset sale such as the proposed transaction is mandatory if the
board was to be adequately protected."' 17 1 Notwithstanding the existence
161. Id. at 11. Because Guardian Bank N.A. had a national bank charter, the OCC was its
primary regulator.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 15-16.
165. Id. at 36-37. The "additional objectionable features" included the allegation that the princi-
pal shareholder obtained the funds he used to purchase the subsidiary and pay off personal debts by
causing the bank to purchase worthless or substandard assets from the subsidiary well in excess of
market value. Id. at 11-48.
166. Id. at 36.
167. Id. at 29.
168. Id. at 30.
169. Id. at 28.
170. Id. at 29.
171. Id. at 28-29.
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of these statements in the attorney's memoranda, the directors were
never advised of any of the above according to the FDIC.172
The attorney's conduct in the divestiture of the mortgage subsidiary,
as described in the complaint, represents a breach of all four of the duties
discussed earlier. The primary problem seemed to be the attorneys' fail-
ure to place the interests of their client-the bank--over those of the
principal shareholder. The attorneys appear to have been looking out
only for the principal shareholder. Secondly, the attorneys were playing
the role of advocate when it appears they should have been acting as
advisor to the client. The attorneys' notes demonstrate their awareness
of a duty to advise on the entirety of the proposed transaction. 173 Yet the
board was never provided that advice. 174 The advice they did provide
was allegedly incomplete and misleading. 175 Not only did the attorneys
fail to advise the client as to the implications of the proposed divestiture,
they also provided assistance to the principal shareholder in structuring
and consummating the deal. 176 Furthermore, the attorneys were aware
that the board was breaching its fiduciary duties to the bank by approv-
ing a transaction without full and complete information. 177
D. In re Fishbein
On March 2, 1992, the OTS startled the banking bar by freezing the
assets of the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hayes and Handler and
seeking $275 million in restitution. 178 In an 83-page notice of charges,
the OTS claimed that Kaye Scholer had participated in violations in the
course of its representation of the now-defunct Lincoln S&L. 179 On
March 10 the firm settled with the OTS for $41 million, reportedly well
in excess of the firm's insurance coverage. 180
Among other things, the OTS alleged that Kaye Scholer was aware
that Lincoln had backdated documents to escape investment limitations
established by regulation, yet advised the bank that such backdating pro-
vided adequate legal support for avoiding the investment limitations.181
172. Id. at 30-32, 49.
173. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
174. Id. at 30-32, 49.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 4.
177. Id. at 58.
178. OT Freezes Kaye, Scholer Assets, supra note 8, at 419. The legality and propriety of the
OTS's freeze of Kaye, Scholer's assets is not within the scope of this note.
179. Id.
180. Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas, Legal Crisis: How a Big Law Firm Was Brought to Its
Knees by Zealous Regulators, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at Al, A4.
181. OT Freezes Kaye, Scholer Assets; supra note 8.
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The attorneys allegedly failed to disclose to Lincoln's board the deficien-
cies in the bank's underwriting and appraisal activity, the reporting of
illusory profits, and insider transactions.1 82 These allegations suggest
that the firm may have failed in its duty of loyalty to the client, to the
benefit of certain insiders. The firm may also have failed to advise as to
the totality of transactions when it provided narrow advice on the invest-
ment limitations matter. Furthermore, the attorneys appear to have
failed in their duty to fully inform the board of known unsafe and un-
sound practices within the institution.
One of the OTS's more controversial claims was that the attorneys
knowingly failed to disclose to the regulator the fact that the bank's exter-
nal auditor had resigned because of concerns over Lincoln's opera-
tions.1 83 The OTS claimed that Kaye Scholer knew the auditor had
concerns about the viability of the institution. Yet it provided the regula-
tors only a copy of the auditor's formal statement which indicated that
the resignation was not the result of the bank's financial health. 18 4 Ac-
cording to the OTS, the attorney's failure to mention the auditor's earlier
comments misled the regulator as to the true condition of the bank.18 5
The OTS claimed that the attorney had violated the provisions of 12
CFR 563.18(b)(1) and (b)(2) 18 6 prohibiting false or misleading state-
ments to the regulator or auditor of the institution by any of its agents. 87
Another disclosure issue involved the attorney's statements to the
regulator regarding the bank's compliance with net worth requirements.
According to the OTS, the attorney was aware of certain "linked transac-
tions" involving a land swapping scheme financed by the bank.18 8 The
existence of these transactions would raise some questions as to the value
of the loans involved. If the value of those loans were in doubt, the
bank's net worth would be overstated. Nevertheless, when asked to re-
spond to the regulator's report questioning whether the bank was meet-
ing its net worth requirements, the attorney failed to mention or even
consider the "linked transactions."1 89
The controversy is centered around whether the OTS, in this partic-
ular claim, is attempting to impose a duty upon the attorney to disclose
information to the regulator. As discussed earlier, the bank attorney
182. Id. at 420.
183. Stevens & Thomas, supra note 180, at A4.
184. Id.
185. 013" Freezes Kaye, Scholer Assets, supra note 8, at 420.
186. 12 C.F.R. § 563.18(b) (1988).
187. OTS Freezes Kaye, Scholer Assets, supra note 8 at 420.
188. Stevens & Thomas, supra note 180, at A4.
189. Id.
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should not be under a general duty to disclose client information to the
regulator. However, the attorney must avoid communicating false or
misleading information to the regulator. Indeed, the attorney may incur
liability by providing misleading information to third parties.19°
Notwithstanding the disclosure issue, it appears that Kaye Scholer
breached several of the basic duties of the bank attorney. It is apparent
that the attorneys assumed an adversarial role in their representation.
Furthermore, it seems that the attorney may have lost sight of the client's
best interests. The attorney's strategy was always to be literally truthful
but never to help the regulator discover damaging information.) 9' How-
ever, avoiding more open disclosure to the regulator was not in the best
interest of the institution. If the officers and directors were involved in
improper activity, the client was the party being harmed. Indeed, the
client failed as result of the improprieties of certain officers and directors.
Had the regulators had a clearer understanding of the bank's condition
earlier, some of the improper activity may have been avoided.' While
earlier intervention by the regulators would have been in the best inter-
ests of the bank, it certainly would not have been welcomed by the of-
ficers and directors perpetrating the crimes and fraud. Thus, the
adversarial approach of the attorney tended to protect those officers and
directors at the expense of the bank.
V. CONCLUSION
The receivers of failed banks and federal banking regulators have
targeted the attorneys of failed institutions in their attempts to recover
the losses. The resulting legal actions have raised many questions as to
the scope and nature of the bank attorney's duties. Are the receivers and
regulators holding the attorneys to higher standards of duty? Or have
these targeted attorneys breached long-standing duties of care and loy-
alty to the client?
The bank attorney should not be held to higher standards of duty.
Nevertheless, the bank attorney's duties are different than those of other
corporate counsel. The bank attorney must consider the highly regulated
nature of banking, public policy factors supporting a strong banking sys-
tem and the stricter duties to which bank directors ate held when advis-
ing or acting on behalf of a bank client. Most importantly, the bank
attorney must keep the interests of the client ahead of those of the officers
and directors. She must advise the client to look beyond mere compli-
190. See supra note 139 and accomanying text.
191. Stevens & Thomas, supra note 180, at A4.
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ance with laws and regulations. Her advice must necessarily encompass
safety and soundness considerations as well as the fiduciary duties of the
directors. The bank attorney should keep the board informed as to po-
tential safety and soundness matters, or instances where their actions
might result in breaches of their duties.
